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A Truly Invisible Hand
The Critical Value of Foucauldian Irony
C A R L O S  PA L A C I O S
abstract  Critical the ory has long resisted the no tion that an “in vis i ble hand” can operate within the 
real so cial dy nam ics of a free mar ket. But de spite the most rad i cal de sires of the so cially crit i cal imag i­
na tion, the op ti mi za tion of that “spon ta ne ous or der” or depersonalized way of or der ing things known 
as “the econ o my” has be come the dom i nant playing field and de ci sive elec toral is sue of mod ern pol i­
tics. Within this broad con tem po rary con text, Michel Foucault made a strange the o ret i cal in ter ven tion 
that, to this day, con tin ues to baf fle read ers. During a lec ture, he ar gued that Adam Smith’s in vis i ble 
hand was, af ter all , truly and pur po sive ly, that is, for tech ni cal rather than ideo log i cal rea sons, “in vis i ble.” 
This ar ti cle ar gues that there is a count er­pos i tiv ism or tac ti cal irony contained within the logic of such 
a con tro ver sial the sis; name ly, that when one ac knowl edges that the prin ci ple of eco nomic com pe ti tion 
en cour ages an ef fi cient self­or ga niz ing ef fect at all times, re gard less of con text, one is also im me di ately 
in a po si tion to ap pre ci ate why the art of gov ern ment should al ways main tain its po lit i cal pri macy over 
the spon ta ne ous or der of the mar ket.
keywords  Michel Foucault, Friedrich A. Hayek, neo lib er al ism, count er­pos i tiv ism, lib eral iro ny
Introduction
Despite the many clas si cal and con tem po rary econ o mists who have rec og nized that 
eco nomic knowl edge only mod els re al ity based on lim ited as sump tions and math­
e mat i cal in fer ence, the ex pec ta tion that econ o mists should be  able to tell us how to 
fix “the econ o my”—and thus the prob lem of fair dis tri bu tion of ma te rial ben e fits 
across so ci ety once and for all , both at a na tional and trans na tional scale—is dif ­
cult to leave be hind.1 This is an ex pec ta tion that is deeply in grained within mod­
ern cul ture and far from re stricted to the con text cre ated by global fi nan cial cri­
sis.2 In their mag is te rial ac count of the his tory of “the in vis i ble hand” be fore Adam 
Smith, Jon a than Sheehan and Dror Wahrman map the mul ti ple ways in which 
sev en teenth­ and eigh teenth­cen tury Eu ro pe ans started to think in terms of spon­
ta ne ous self­or ga ni za tion, and they of er a tell ing crit i cal com men tary on Smith, 
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not ing, to ward the end, that no where in his works can one find an ex pla na tion for 
the re peated de scrip tion of the mar ket as a “near ly” per fect means of al lo cat ing a 
so ci e ty’s vi tal re sources: “What guar an tees that the dis tri bu tion of necessar ies by 
this in vis i ble hand would be ‘near ly’ that of a fully egal i tar ian and just world?”3
This con tinu ing con cern with a guar an tee, I ar gue, is a Western ob ses sion that 
Michel Foucault asks us to leave be hind. It is an ex pec ta tion that, his tor i cal ly, we 
cre ated for our selves, an in ven tion that we added to our ideas of or der and objectiv­
ity.4 Ultimately, there is no need for such an over am bi tious ex pec ta tion, and only 
with out it can eco nomic knowl edge re spon si bly per form the crit i cal po lit i cal role 
that it has been called on to play in mod ern governmentality. It is true that Fou­
cault’s ini tial re ac tion to this Western ob ses sion is rather pes si mis tic. The Order of 
Things ad vo cates in the end a form of knowl edge that goes be yond what he con sid­
ers to be the flawed “mod ern episteme,” a dis cur sive con fig u ra tion that, al though 
obsessed with dis cov er ing the most au then tic capacities of hu man be ings, only 
man ages to pro duce knowl edge of “Man” through a move ment of “in ter mi na ble 
cross­ref er ence” with its own prem ises.5 My ar gu ment is that Foucault’s cri tique 
of this ob ses sion is ar tic u lated in pos i tive rather than purely neg a tive terms dur ing 
his 1979 lec tures at the Collège de France on the lib eral governmentality of mo der­
ni ty, and spe cifi  cally dur ing his lec ture on the in vis i ble hand, where he con cludes 
that eco nom ics should be con sid ered a “sci ence lat eral to the art of governing.”6
The ironic truth that Foucault is at pains to ex plain dur ing his lec ture on the 
in vis i ble hand is that, in prin ci ple, the mar ket mech a nism can in fact be expected 
to “work”—and that this can be expected, not de spite but thanks to its in vis i bil i ty. 
Its “in vis i bil i ty” cor re sponds, con crete ly, to the chaos that sur rounds any scene of 
ex change, that is, to all the ex ter nal fac tors that ul ti mately en dow each eco nomic 
en coun ter with the kind of un cer tainty out of which calculative ac tors can ex tract 
ad van tage. Many fac tors of this kind cor re spond to what, since the work of Ar thur 
Pigou, have been called “ex ter nal i ties.”7 For econ o mists, these ex ter nal fac tors are 
gen er ally treated as un ac counted costs and ben e fits that come to dis rupt the in ter nal 
equi lib rium that eco nomic ex changes are sup posed to main tain and fos ter for the 
sake of so ci e tal fair ness. Yet the irony is that, from Foucault’s ac count, one can in fer 
that the mar ket works through ex ter nal i ties. It is this ironic and po lit i cally prob lem­
atic de pen dence on the opaque “lab y rinths and complexities of the [to tal] eco nomic 
field” that al lows Foucault to iden ti fy, at the end of the lec ture, a nec es sar ily crit i cal, 
sec ond ary, or “lat er al” role for mar ket eco nom ics within the art of gov ern ment.8
Delving into this mat ter is par tic u larly rel e vant at a time when the call for a 
more so cially rad i cal ap proach to the in vis i ble hand is be ing voiced by au thor i ta­
tive econ o mists and when even such a main stream pub lic out let for this dis ci pline 
as the Economist is will ing to ded i cate its 175th an ni ver sary is sue to a “man i fes to” 
for a lib eral type of eco nomic knowl edge that is truly “for the peo ple.”9 Foucault’s 
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anal y sis of neo lib er al ism was heavily in formed by the work of Friedrich A. Hayek, 
as com men ta tors of the lec tures have of en not ed, in clud ing in read ings that ques­
tion Foucault’s own po lit i cal po si tion.10 For one such com men ta tor and per haps the 
lead ing voice in this po lem ic, Dan iel Zamora, the ques tion about the po lit i cal role 
of mar ket eco nom ics does not even seem worth pos ing, given that he, for ex am ple, 
re jects a mar ket­in spired so lu tion such as uni ver sal ba sic in come with out hes i ta­
tion.11 But this crit i cal habit of po lar iz ing mar ket knowl edge by afxing the la bel 
“neo lib er al” to one or an other au thor or idea does lit tle to elu ci date how an al ready 
mar ket­ori ented global so ci ety can move to ward a more rad i cal path.12
My own con clu sion will be that Foucault, by read ing Hayek with open ness of 
mind and a pe cu liar sense of iro ny, man aged to de ci sively de sta bi lize the tel e o log i cal 
ap proach to spon ta ne ous or der in neo lib eral thought. Without this tel e o log i cal ob ses­
sion, Hayek would have been  able to ap pre ci ate his mod est tech ni cal in sight on spon­
ta ne ous eco nomic co or di na tion (name ly, that only real com pe ti tion re veals how ef ­
cient a given mar ket can be come at exploiting scarce re sources), with out succumbing 
to the sense that his the ory some how needed to ar rive at a deeper ex pla na tion. Hayek 
wanted eco nomic knowl edge to guar an tee that the mar ket would al ways be the best 
way of orienting the po lit i cal tasks of or ga niz ing pro duc tive en er gies and dis trib ut ing 
ma te rial ben e fits in any so ci e ty. He wanted to as sure us that the price mech a nism is 
“near ly” per fect or, as he phrased it, that it “is enough of a mar vel even if, in a con­
stantly chang ing world, not all will hit it of so per fect ly.”13 It is this type of seem ingly 
qual i fied but in re al ity still ob ses sive as pi ra tion that Foucault sought to dis cour age.
A Somehow Invisible Order
Foucault’s anal y sis of the in vis i ble hand is highly coun ter in tu i tive be cause, in prin­
ci ple, it seeks to stress in the same vein as Hannah Arendt that a phe nom e no log i­
cal opac ity un der lies the hu man re al ity con cep tu al ized in terms of “in ter ests.” All 
he wants to say is that Smith’s in vis i ble hand truly is in vis i ble. In a way, the moral 
of Foucault’s lec ture, as Lev Marder il lus tra tively puts it, is that homo economicus 
“has no clue which choice is the right one, or which choice max i mizes util i ty.”14 
This in trin sic lack of cer tainty in mat ters of in ter est was, to an im por tant ex tent, 
Arendt’s crit i cal ob ser va tion as well. She iron i cally writes in The Human Condi-
tion that Adam Smith’s idea of a “har mony of in ter ests” should be con sid ered the 
foun da tional “com mu nis tic fic tion” of eco nomic lib er al ism.15 Her cri tique of the 
lan guage of in ter ests reappears a few years later in On Revolution, where it is then 
deployed in a cri tique of Jean­Jacques Rousseau, whose “si lent as sump tion,” she 
de clares, “is that the will is some sort of au to matic ar tic u la tion of in ter est.”16 In the 
case of Arendt, how ev er, one can clearly rec og nize a “debunking” tone that seeks to 
con front the sup posed use ful ness of this ter mi nol ogy for a uni ver sal—or what she 
crit i cally calls an “Archimedean”—po lit i cal pro ject.17
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The force of Arendt’s cri tique ar gu ably stems from a phe nom e no log i cal in sight 
about the opac ity of the hu man psyche. As she ar tic u lates it to ex plain the cause of 
“the Terror” dur ing the early 1780s: de ter min ing the “in ter est” of an in di vid u al, 
the gen u ine in ter est of a French cit i zen given the plight of “the peo ple,” for ex am­
ple, is sim ply not pos si ble, since “how ever deeply felt a mo tive may be, once it is 
brought out and ex posed for pub lic in spec tion it be comes an ob ject of sus pi cion 
rather than in sight.”18 Arendt’s phe nom e no log i cal ra tio nale is im me di ately rec og­
niz able. Anthropologists have found that, in fact, “the opac ity of other minds” is 
ex ten sively rec og nized across cul tures.19 Her ra tio nale is sim ply that it is im pos si­
ble to dis cern what an in di vid u al’s “in ter est” is in a con clu sive man ner, not ex actly 
be cause in di vid u als can not be trusted to give a re li able ac count of them selves, but, 
more pre cise ly, be cause af er the ques tion has been asked or the test, how ever it is 
designed, has been ap plied, there is no way of confirming the validity of an an swer 
within the opaque and cha otic realm of the hu man psyche. Foucault’s anal y sis is 
sim i larly cog ni zant of the in her ent lack of vis i bil ity that a com plex hu man phe­
nom e non driven by deeply con tin gent fac tors is bound to cre ate. And yet, he does 
not reach Arendt’s pes si mis tic con clu sion, according to which any gen er al iza tion 
of the col lab o ra tive ef ect that can emerge from the col lec tive in ter play of “in ter­
ests” should be con sid ered a mat ter of fic tion.
Before delv ing into the po lem i cal con tent of his coun ter in tu i tive read ing, I 
would like to ad dress two con vo luted as pects of Foucault’s style of anal y sis in his 
lec ture course. On the one hand, there is clearly a cer tain line of in quiry within the 
lec tures on what Jessica Whyte has re cently called the nar row “crit i cal trope” (as 
op posed to the “so cial mod el”) of in vis i bil ity that can be de rived from Hayek’s and 
Smith’s work.20 According to Whyte, this is a trope that con ve niently helps Foucault 
to ad vance his own po lit i cal pro ject of cri tiqu ing sov er eignty and “cut[ting] of the 
King’s head.”21 Ostensibly, by fo cus ing on this trope alone, Foucault was ir re spon si bly 
ig nor ing the per ni cious ef ects of an in vis i ble or der, which, if re ified—and Whyte 
be lieves that Foucault does re ify it—is bound to work against “any col lec tive po lit i cal 
ac tion that aims to es tab lish and work to wards col lec tively de ter mined ends.”22
My ar gu ment is that Foucault did the op po site of re ify ing our un der stand­
ing of the in vis i ble hand, but even be fore mak ing that ar gu ment, we must rec og­
nize that Foucault established ex plic it ly, par tic u larly at the be gin ning and end of 
his lec ture course, a much broader scope for his in quiry than the one that Whyte 
identifies. His point was to study the ge ne al ogy of crit i cal re flec tion on “the art of 
governing,” but not just from the “out side” but rather also “from with in,” that is 
to say, as it re fers to “the rea soned way of governing best.” The “ex er cise of po lit­
i cal sov er eign ty,” as he put it, was in fact his fo cus.23 It is only that, meth od o log i­
cal ly, he de cided to ap proach mod ern gov ern men tal prac tice from the per spec tive 
of its dif er ent rationalizations. Instead of adding to the the o ri za tion or his tory of 
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some thing called the state’s “sov er eign ty” or “le git i ma cy,” and thus as sum ing that 
such po lit i cal mat ters could be treated in terms of a uni ver sal qual i ty, right, or en ti­
tle ment, he con cep tu al ized mod ern lib eral governmentality in terms of a prac tice 
of state craf that works through cri tique.24 Liberal gov ern ment, in this sense, does 
not work through set po lit i cal ideas, not even through an idea as closely as so ci ated 
with it as “the mar ket,” but rather through chang ing rationalizations, jus ti fi ca tions, 
or ex er cises of judg ment on the in ter ests that should be pri or i tized in so ci ety for 
their “col lec tive util i ty” within a given junc ture of po lit i cal life.25
Philip Mirowski is an other critic of Foucault’s ap proach to the in vis i ble hand 
who, like Whyte, has con cluded that “Foucault de nied any ef  cacy to the mod ern 
con scious in tent on the part of any one to ex ert po lit i cal pow er, be cause the mar­
ket ef ec tively thwarts it.”26 Mirowski ig nores here that Foucault’s method is ac tu­
ally aimed at un der stand ing the ac tive, al beit in trin si cally crit i cal, po lit i cal role of 
the econ o mist. The jus ti fi ca tion for Mirowski’s neg a tive as sess ment of the lec tures, 
how ev er, is much more condescending than Whyte’s. Largely dismissing Foucault’s 
ground break ing ap proach to the quin tes sen tial phil o soph i cal prob lem of “truth,” 
Mirowski implies that in this lec ture course the mar ket comes “equipped with 
su per nat u ral pow ers of truth pro duc tion.”27
Foucault does con cep tu al ize the mar ket as a “site of veridiction” that man ages 
to per suade eigh teenth­cen tury sov er eigns of the need for lib eral rule based on 
util i tar ian and far from in trin si cally hu man ist ar gu ments.28 But he is only show ing 
how these sov er eigns sud denly came to rec og nize the ur gency of this po lit i cal shif 
as a rel e vant prob lem within the con tin u ally chang ing lim its of what was ac cepted 
as true. Foucault is not ask ing the reader to be lieve that the mar ket is an in for ma­
tion pro ces sor that hu mans must sub mit to with blind obe di ence or in keep ing with 
an al most re li gious faith. Whyte ar gues that this is in deed the case for Hayek.29 Fou­
cault, on the other hand, makes an ef ort to es tab lish in un equiv o cal terms that the 
in vis i ble hand works thanks to its in de pen dence from any type of prov i den tial or 
even prov i dence­like ra tio nale. Whether or not his ac count works as a his tor i cally 
ac cu rate nar ra tive of po lit i cal sec u lar i za tion, the ef ort alone re veals the nonteleo­
logical per spec tive that Foucault relies on to ex plain the mar ket.
God as a Useful Argumentative Locus
Foucault’s anal y sis of the in vis i ble hand occupies the space of about ten pages of 
tran scribed speech. This rea son alone should make us skep ti cal of the claim that 
his read ing of lib eral pi o neers such as Adam Smith and Marquis de Condorcet is 
meant to of er a whole al ter na tive ac count of mod ern sec u lar i za tion.30 Despite the 
claims made in crit i cal read ings by such cur rently in flu en tial schol ars as Giorgio 
Agamben and Mitchell Dean, Foucault’s in ten tion does not seem to have been to 
pro vide such an ac count.31 He starts by not ing, in fact, that his aim is sim ply to 
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in vite the au di ence to con sider the fact that, al though the usual theo log i cal read ing 
fo cuses on “the hand,” “the other el e ment, in vis i bil i ty, is at least as im por tant.”32 
The dif  culty in grasp ing his ar gu ment de rives from the way he de liv ers it at some 
mo ments, ex trap o lat ing in rather dra matic and over blown ways. In the plainest of 
terms, he de clares that: “eco nom ics is an athe is tic dis ci pline; eco nom ics is a dis ci­
pline with out God.”33
This in fer ence, if taken at face val ue, is defi  nitely im pre cise, for there are clear 
cases of prov i den tial think ing in in flu en tial lib eral the o ri za tions of the in vis i ble 
hand af er Adam Smith, and Adam Smith him self fre quently used prov i den tial 
lan guage.34 In the con text of Foucault’s spe cific ar gu ment, how ev er, these two sen­
tences do serve a pur pose. Together, they pro duce a cer tain rhe tor i cal ef ect. They 
cre ate a gran di ose im age in which not even an all ­know ing god can have ac cess to 
the work ings of the mar ket; no other im age would per suade us with the same force 
of what Foucault has suggested a mo ment ear li er, namely that in lib eral thought 
“the eco nomic world is nat u rally opaque and nat u rally non­totalizable.”35
Foucault’s ar gu men ta tive ori en ta tion to ward God seems on the sur face dis con­
cert ing. Smith in his an a ly ses is gen er ally  able to pro ceed with out “starting the is ti­
cally from God’s will,” as Smith scholar Fonna Forman­Barzilai has remarked.36 In 
this sense, it mat ters lit tle whether his ap proach is “sec u lar” or ul ti mately implies, to 
use Agamben’s words, that “God has made the world just as if it were with out God and 
gov erns it as though it governed itself.”37 More to the point, in The Wealth of Nations 
one never finds an ex trap o la tion as ex treme as the one drawn by Foucault. The text 
only goes as far as to state that the task of over see ing the pro cess of mar ket self­
reg u la tion in a so ci ety can “safely be trusted, not only to no sin gle per son, but to no 
coun cil or sen ate what ev er.”38 By itself, in fact, this gen er al iza tion is al ready suf  cient 
to sup port Foucault’s read ing, with out our hav ing to in volve God in any ca pac i ty. The 
mar ket not only de mands a cer tain level of au ton omy or “laissez faire,” as the rul­
ers and sov er eigns at the time had al ready been ad vised by the physiocrats, but also 
im poses a fun da men tal re stric tion on the ex tent to which we can trust the ac cu racy 
of any knowl edge of its op er a tions.39 To guar an tee the “proper per for mance” of the 
mar ket, as Smith de ci sively rea sons in a pas sage that Foucault reads out loud to his 
au di ence, there is “no hu man wis dom or knowl edge [that] could ever be suf  cient.”40
Of more sig nifi  cance to this in ter pre ta tion than the mat ter of sec u lar i za tion is 
the fact that Foucault de cides to in volve God with out hav ing to do so. His anal y sis 
sugg ests from the start that, if the in vis i ble hand had been for Smith noth ing but 
a prov i den tial will, then Smith might not have had the same level of prom i nence 
in Western his to ry, since other un der stand ings of God, like Nicolas Malebranche’s, 
could have eas ily pro vided an “ab so lute mas ter” draw ing “to gether the threads of 
all these dis persed in ter ests.”41 Foucault uses God, in other words, in a coun ter­
fac tual il lus tra tion of his the sis that the ac tual dy namic of the mar ket is bound to 
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re main un know able or “in vis i ble.” God’s eco nomic blind ness be comes the ul ti mate 
proof in Foucault’s dis course that there can be no “ab so lute mas ter” of the im ma­
nent pro cesses of a free mar ket.
This is a strange coun ter fac tual for a num ber of rea sons. First, it is of course 
not re ally a coun ter fac tual to the ex tent that one can not speak of what God knows 
or does not know as a kind of ev i dence for an ar gu ment, even if Foucault’s God does 
oc cupy a dis cern ible po si tion in the sev en teenth­ and eigh teenth­cen tury de bates 
on prov i den tial ma te ri al ism, wedged as these were be tween the be lief that only 
God can see the global chain of ef ects, and the res o lu tion that “adding God to the 
ex pla na tion brings no ad di tional in for ma tion.”42
Second, by the time Foucault ar rives at his read ing of Smith’s work in the lec­
ture, he has al ready man aged to ex plain through a read ing of a clas si cal text by 
Condorcet that the syn the sis of in ter ests in the mar ket is pro duced in an ab so­
lutely cha otic and vol a tile man ner. Mirroring Arendt’s phe nom e no log i cal in sight 
about the hu man psyche but re fer ring to the ex ter nal plane of ex pe ri ence, Foucault 
ef ec tively de scribes the mar ket sce nario as one that eludes all re li able doc u men ta­
tion. All scenes that cen ter on a re source ful homo economicus who scav enges for his 
max i mum eco nomic ben e fit and, in do ing so, gen er ates an op ti mal col lec tive bal­
ance are scenes that in ev i ta bly owe their ef ec tive level of re al ity (how ever much we 
de cide to grant them) to the “im ma nence” of un fore see able fac tors—from “ac ci­
dents of na ture” to “more or less dis tant po lit i cal events,” and in fact “an infinite 
num ber of things.”43 Uncertainty is in trin si cally part of the re al ity of these ex ter nal 
fac tors, and yet, these fac tors ul ti mately de ter mine the profit that it is pos si ble to 
gain, that is to say, the ad van tage or so­called “in ter est” that would be spe cific to 
ev ery in di vid ual in an eco nomic ex change. As Foucault puts it, “the most dis tant 
event tak ing place on the other side of the world may af ect my in ter est, and there 
is noth ing I can do about it.”44
The third and, for our pur poses, most im por tant odd ity about Foucault’s coun­
ter fac tual is its re la tion to his own work on the ge ne al ogy of the mod ern sub ject.45 By 
de cid ing to in volve God in this way, Foucault marks a rad i cal break with all the forms 
of ep i ste mic opac ity that he had pre vi ously con sid ered to be “her me neu tic” in mod­
ern thought. For Foucault, Western cul ture in gen eral dem on strates a prob lem atic 
con cern with bring ing to light the truth of the sub ject as some thing that is deeply 
seated within the in di vid u al’s own in ner na ture.46 In other lec ture courses, he traces 
this “her me neu tics of the self ” back to the Chris tian pas tor ate, where the tech nique 
of con fes sion evolved as part of a gen er al ized sub or di na tion of con sci ence whose 
ul ti mate pur pose, Foucault in sists, was obe di ence itself, since the truth of each in di­
vid u al’s sal va tion is un known even to the pas tor who is sup posed to lis ten to and dis­
ci pline his flock. The knowl edge that is needed to care for the col lec tively de sir able 
fu ture of pop u la tions and in di vid u als is, in this case, “en tirely in God’s hands.”47
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In this way, God had been help ing Foucault, in the scheme of his larger ge ne­
al o gy, to ex plain the pe cu liar de mand for self­avowal made by mod ern fig ures of 
hu man ist au thor ity such as psy chi a trists and judges—their need for oth ers to ver­
bal ize self­ac tu al iz ing state ments of judg ment like, “fi ne, yes, I am mad”—as the 
ex pres sion of a her me neu tic be lief in the idea that there is a se cret truth within 
each sub ject about their nor mal ity or ab nor mal i ty.48 Foucault’s pas to ral de pic tion 
of God in the case of me di e val con fes sional prac tices sugg ests, in other words, that 
a Chris tian leg acy ac counts for the con sti tu tive unattainability of many dom i nant 
in tel lec tual goals in our own his tor i cal era, such as psy chol o gy’s tra di tional ef ort 
to find and re veal the se cret be hind our “re pressed” sex u al i ty.49 But in his dis cus­
sion of the in vis i ble hand, the de pic tion changes. The link be tween God and truth 
is sev ered, and this al lows Foucault to por tray a mode of in ter ven tion that from the 
be gin ning em braces the ep i ste mic opac ity of its own way of solv ing things.
From the per spec tive of ered by Foucault in his last course at the Collège de 
France on mod ern governmentality, lib eral eco nom ics is not built upon the as pi­
ra tion to fully il lu mi nate, once and for all , the opac ity of the mar ket dy nam ic.50 
Not even God can per form such a feat. This limit of hu man knowl edge is not like 
the other ex am ples of ep i ste mic opac ity that Foucault had in ves ti gated be fore, for 
it does not work as an elu sive se cret that is be lieved to be hid den and seated deep 
within the sub ject or even deep within so ci e ty.51 The mar ket’s “in vis i bil i ty” sim ply 
cor re sponds to the on tol ogy of a hu man re al ity that is most ac cu rately de scribed as 
an “in defi  nite field of im ma nence,” to the ex tent that it is com posed of ex tremely 
con tin gent forces and, for that sim ple rea son, strictly speak ing at least, of nonmap­
pable op er a tions.52 This is an opac ity that is not “her me neu tic” but “tech ni cal.” 53
Hayek’s Technical Insight
It is Hayek who elu ci dates the prob lem that Foucault is re fer ring to, the way an 
ap pre ci a tion of the mar ket as an eco nomic or der that is nec es sar ily messy and hence 
“in vis i ble” or far from re li ably map pa ble does not lead to a her me neu tic but, rath er, 
to a tech ni cal knowl edge of the spon ta ne ous dy nam ics cre ated by a cha otic homo eco-
nomicus.54 If Foucault had not read Hayek, it would be dif  cult to ac count for his sense 
that a con tem po rary au di ence might be ca pa ble of re lat ing to a game of truth in volv­
ing an un cer tain homo economicus, where “all these in vol un tary, in defi  nite, un con trol­
la ble, and nontotalizable fea tures of his sit u a tion do not dis qual ify his in ter est or the 
cal cu la tion that he may make to max i mize it.” “On the con trary, all these in defi  nite 
fea tures of his sit u a tion found, as it were, the spe cifi  cally in di vid ual cal cu la tion that 
he makes.” Foucault’s train of thought, on its own, with no other in ter pre tive con­
text, would in deed be star tling, for his con clu sion is that these vol a tile fac tors in fact 
en dow the pur suit of one’s own in ter est with “con sis tency [and] ef ect”; they “in sert it 
in re al i ty, and con nect it in the best pos si ble way to the rest of the world.”55
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Hayek’s key in sight, in this sense, emerged early in his work, dur ing what he 
him self dubbed his “pre­phil o soph i cal” and “nar row” phase of work on “tech ni­
cal eco nom ics.”56 This tech ni cal area of his work has been cru cial for Foucauldian 
ge ne al o gists like Nicholas Gane, who have reconstructed the root prob lem­space of 
neo lib eral thought.57 Unlike his broader spec u la tions on so cial the o ry, the eco nomic 
ar gu ment that Hayek de vel oped dur ing the de bate with the mar ket so cial ists in the 
1930s and 1940s has had en dur ing validity.58 As Gane in ci sively puts it: “The chal lenge 
that the Lef, as well as those com mit ted to more clas si cal lib eral prin ci ples, still face 
to day is how to re spond.”59 Foucault’s anal y sis of ers a way of tak ing such a his tor i­
cally de ci sive de bate in a pro gres sive di rec tion, even if he an a lyt i cally comes to rely 
on Hayek’s in sight or, rath er, pre cisely be cause he is will ing to take the neo lib eral 
con tri bu tion as a step ping stone to ar rive at a more re fined po si tion.
What we need to know but is not made fully ex plicit dur ing the lec ture is why 
homo economicus can co or di nate his in ter ests with those of oth ers “in the best pos si ble 
way,” as Foucault grants with out qual i fi ca tions, de spite the lack of com plete in for ma­
tion about the fac tors influ enc ing the mar ket. In a pas sage that clearly res o nates with 
Foucault’s lec ture, Hayek starts by presenting this very prob lem, elab o rat ing on how 
“there is hardly any thing that hap pens any where in the world that might not have an 
ef ect on the de ci sion he [‘the man on the spot’] ought to make.” The dif er ence is 
that, in this case, Hayek im me di ately brings his train of thought to a cli max by pro­
vid ing an ex pla na tion: “But he need not know of these events as such, nor of all their 
ef ects.” All that an eco nomic agent re ally needs to know is whether the price of a cer­
tain good has in creased or de creased, and not, as Hayek em pha sizes, “why.”60
Prices are cus tom ized in for ma tion de vices that sim plify ex tremely com plex 
ma te rial re la tions for the ben e fit of in di vid ual en tre pre neur ial agents. This de vice 
is  able to com mu ni cate to each of these agents within their own situated en vi ron­
ment a sin gle piece of in for ma tion—a “sig nal”—that is use ful in itself, namely 
be cause it in di cates “how much more or less dif  cult to pro cure” any good or ser vice 
has be come on the mar ket.61 Through this de cep tively sim ple op er a tion of lo cal ized 
quan ti fi ca tion, the mar ket man ages to in cen tiv ize a highly dy namic man age ment 
of a so ci e ty’s dis persed eco nomic knowl edge, prompting all “eco nomic men” to 
com pete wise ly, at least to the ex tent that any player of a suf  ciently com plex game 
can as pire to do so. The price mech a nism al lows these ac tors to make in formed if 
far from per fectly safe de ci sions as to where they should risk investing them selves 
and seek to ex ploit niche­based ad van tages.
Hayek largely ig nores the glar ing so cial ten sion in this ra tio nale, since only 
in di vid u als with a sub stan tial safety net or priv i leged ac cess to cap i tal would be in a 
po si tion to take fi nan cial risks for the sake of max i miz ing profi t. But since this will 
no doubt be abun dantly clear to read ers of crit i cal the o ry, I will set it aside for now 
and only return to it when we are in a po si tion to con sider it with out hav ing to cre ate 
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an ir re solv able con flict be tween two moral or ders of ap pro pri a tion.62 What is de ci­
sive at this point is that, whether the nom i nal var i a tion that such priv i leged in di vid­
u als are in formed of is cre ated through a highly pub li cized dis cov ery (“a new mine 
has been found!”) or a pri vate, dis tant, dis persed and un in tel li gi ble event, the price 
mech a nism, re gard less of the in vis i ble fac tors that con sti tute it, in ef ect lo cally guides 
each (en ti tled) homo economicus in his search for cheaper, more ef  cient meth ods 
for us ing and dis trib ut ing the re sources that are avail able in a given econ o my.
Historically, and to this day, much crit i cal so cial the ory has sought to dem on­
strate that there is no such thing as “the law of the mar ket”: that the per fect con di tions 
that are re quired for a fair dy nam ics of eco nomic ex change have never existed, and 
that if mar ket econ o mies man age to work de spite the rad i cal un cer tainty of fac tors 
af ect ing all ex change sit u a tions, it is only thanks to the sta bi liz ing ef ects of the so cial 
net works and so cial re la tion ships in which these sit u a tions are em bed ded.63 Hayek’s 
ex pla na tion, how ev er, is clear on the fact that such ideal con di tions for eco nomic 
equi lib rium as “per fect knowl edge” and an “ab sence of mo nop o ly” are un nec es sary, 
and, in fact, that only in im per fect con di tions can the mar ket dy nam ics of com pe ti­
tion pro duce the expected ef ect of near­op ti mal ef  cien cy.64 It is be cause the most 
ef  cient meth ods for pro duc tion and dis tri bu tion are al ways im per fectly known that 
there is an ar gu ment for un re strained eco nomic com pe ti tion in the first place: overly 
am bi tious en tre pre neurs are the peo ple who can pro gres sively dis cov er these op ti mal 
meth ods. And it is thanks to the net works and so cial re la tion ships de vel oped by these 
eco nomic ac tors that the knowl edge that they have gath ered in di vid u ally can spread, 
for their in ti mate un der stand ing of their peers’ work al lows them to choose the most 
ef  cient pro vid ers, who in turn cre ate sub stan tial mo nop o lies thanks to the bet ter 
qual ity and cost made pos si ble by their unique meth ods of pro duc tion.65
Hayek’s tech ni cal ar gu ment has con trib uted to con tem po rary eco nomic the­
ory in count less ways, but given its sub jec tiv ism and dis be lief in the per fec tion ism 
of neoclassical equi lib rium the o ry, its greatest source of in flu ence and an a lyt i cal 
ef ec tiv ity may still be the way in which it chal lenges any crit i cal the o ri za tion of the 
mar ket or, as he liked to call it, any ap proach to the econ omy from the per spec tive 
of “so cial jus tice.”66 The way Hayek chal lenged the so cial ist cal cu la tion of fair ini tial 
prices for a free and com pet i tive econ omy (with col lec tive own er ship of the means 
of pro duc tion) con tin ues to have a tech ni cal rel e vance that can not be eas ily swept 
aside, even through so phis ti cated post­rad i cal prop o si tions such as Michel Callon’s 
“po lit i cal en gi neer ing of mar kets.”67 The cru cial tech ni cal ques tion that emerged 
dur ing the in flu en tial “so cial ist cal cu la tion de bate,” as a widely respected eco­
nomic his to rian has commented, was how one could, from an ad min is tra tive point 
of view, es tab lish ini tial prices that could “ac cu rately re flect un der ly ing rel a tive 
scar ci ties.”68 The best meth od, pro posed by mar ket so cial ist Oskar Lange in 1936, 
was one of pe ri odic price as sign ment, fol low ing an ac count ing method of trial and 
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er ror for cap i tal goods, through which any short age or sur plus of re sources could 
sim ply be pe ri od i cally ad just ed.69 Hayek’s de ci sive re but tal to this cal cu la tion of 
prices, which sought to as cer tain the best dis tri bu tion be tween existing needs and 
avail able goods, was that “[one can never as sume] a ‘giv en’ quan tity of scarce goods. 
Which goods are scarce . . .  or how scarce or valu able they are, is pre cisely one of 
the con di tions that com pe ti tion should dis cov er.”70
An im por tant as pi ra tion of a so cial ist mar ket is to be com pre hen sive in the way 
it bal ances the costs of pro duc tion for a whole so ci e ty.71 But against an ac count ing 
method that thor oughly con sid ers “giv en” quan ti ties—of ex ploit able re sources, 
ur gent needs, manufacturable goods, and so cial costs or “ex ter nal i ties”—Hayek’s 
ar gu ment is that only the live dy namic of a truly com pet i tive mar ket can tell us how 
pro duc tive an econ omy can ac tu ally be. When cap i tal ist en tre pre neurs scav enge for 
profit mar gins by experimenting with new meth ods and mar ket niches, and com pe­
ti tion is not in the hands of the ac count ing man ag ers of sta ble so cial ist firms with 
safe slots in na tional in dus tries, it be comes pos si ble to know how low the costs of 
pro duc ing any thing can go and, there fore, how much scar city and abun dance truly 
ex ist in any hu man so ci ety that is try ing to de cide how to best sat isfy its eco nomic 
re quire ments. The la tent irony in this neo lib eral re but tal, as I will elab o rate in the 
con clu sion, is that any mar ket­driven dis cov ery of “op ti mal ef  cien cy” can also be 
said to be a “giv en” quan tity of manufacturable goods that has only a rel a tive val ue. If 
“scar ci ty” is not the same as “lim ited re sources,” if it is a crit i cal tool that we con cep tu­
ally use to ques tion a pop u la tion’s re la tion to its ma te rial po ten tial—as even Malthus 
thought and Hayek was keen to re mind mar ket so cial ists in an ar gu ment about com­
pet i tive pro duc tion—then assessing the pol icy needs of any econ omy that is try ing 
to deal with this crit i cal mat ter calls, in ev ery con text, for a fully re la tional anal y sis.72
The Divergence be tween Hayek and Foucault
To draw a clear con nec tion with Foucault in my brief ac count of Hayek’s tech ni cal 
eco nom ics, I re ferred to the nonhermeneutic con cept of “in vis i bil i ty.” But, in re al­
i ty, it is Foucault who drew out this im pli ca tion and ex plic itly ap plied it to the foun­
da tional eco nomic trope as so ci ated with Adam Smith. Hayek, on the other hand, 
found it much harder to rec on cile the in vis i bil ity of the mar ket with his own in tel­
lec tual pro ject, a pro ject bent, as he man aged to ar tic u late in 1937, on con vey ing 
greater em pir i cal ac cu racy than any stan dard ex pla na tion re ly ing on “the ad mit­
tedly fic ti tious state of mar ket equi lib ri um” could pro vi de.73
As Bruce Caldwell has re cently evidenced through a re view of long un pub­
lished notes and lec tures, it took Hayek a long time to come to grips with the fact 
that the live pro cess of eco nomic com pe ti tion did not have any deeper ex pla na­
tion, a kind of more “causal mech a nism” that could ac count for what ac tu ally at an 
“on to log i cal” level was at work in the vol a tile price­driven dy namic of the mar ket.74 
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His need for epis te mo log i cal cer tainty is clear from the be gin ning. Hayek closes his 
well­known 1945 ar ti cle in the Amer i can Economic Review, “The Use of Knowledge in 
Society,” with a pa tron iz ing state ment on how his dis ci pline had up un til then been 
fo cused on a ques tion that, al though help ful, was merely “pre lim i nary to the study 
of the main prob lem.”75 And in the early 1960s, af er many drafs and false starts in 
this di rec tion, Hayek as serts with much frus tra tion: “I have not only not succeeded 
in work ing out such a more pre cise the ory but have also be come rather doubt ful 
whether there is much more to be said.”76
Afer this point, in his 1968 lec ture on “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” 
we can hear Hayek fully accepting and, fur ther, insisting on the fact that since “the 
validity of the the ory of com pe ti tion can never be em pir i cally ver i fied,” the im pli­
ca tion is that “macrotheory then of en af ords ap prox i mate val ues or, prob a bly, 
pre dic tions that we are un able to ob tain in any other way.”77 But even then, at his 
most con cil ia to ry, he main tains his tel e o log i cal view of the spon ta ne ous or der of 
the mar ket. To close the lec ture, he of ers an ab so lute and uni ver sal judg ment on 
all eco nomic mat ters of pol i cy­mak ing, con clud ing that mod ern states need to dis­
card all dis trib u tive ar gu ments based on cri te ria of “so cial jus tice” and, in this way, 
“no lon ger de lay attacking the root cause of the prob lem.”78
Hayek, then, for some rea son feels com fort able draw ing a tel e o log i cal in fer ence 
about the mar ket’s po lit i cal role in so ci e ty. There is no in ter nal ne ces sity in this in fer­
ence, even if, as Hayek suc cinctly ar gues in his 1974 Nobel lec ture, one must grant 
that, be yond what any the o ret i cal cal cu la tion or as sort ment of sta tis ti cal data could 
prove, a mar ket so lu tion based on en tre pre neur ial com pe ti tion owes its “su pe ri or i ty” 
(by which one should strictly un der stand only the com par a tive ad van tage that the 
lat ter has in terms of pro duc tive ef  cien cy) to the very un know abil ity of its em pir i cal 
dy nam ic.79 Foucault draws, in fact, the ex act op po site of a tel e o log i cal in fer ence from 
the in sight that the mar ket dy namic is bound to re main “in vis i ble.” Market ex per tise 
can not avoid hav ing, in his view, a “lat er al” or tan gen tial role in the art of gov ern ment:
Political econ omy is in deed a sci ence, a type of knowl edge (savoir), a mode of knowl­
edge (connaissance) which those who gov ern must take into ac count. But eco nomic sci­
ence can not be the sci ence of gov ern ment and eco nom ics can not be the in ter nal prin­
ci ple, law, rule of con duct, or ra tio nal ity of gov ern ment. . . .  One must gov ern with 
eco nom ics, one must gov ern along side econ o mists, one must gov ern by lis ten ing to 
the econ o mists, but eco nom ics must not be and there is no ques tion that it can be the 
gov ern men tal ra tio nal ity itself.80
Foucault does not elab o rate on this in fer ence. I have ar gued, how ev er, that the logic 
of his ar gu ment can be de rived, not only from the nar ra tive arc of his lec ture, but 
also from its im plied fa mil iar ity with Hayekian dis course. In gen er al, this in ter ven­
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tion con sti tutes an im por tant re state ment of Foucault’s view on mod ern knowl­
edge. The founding tech ni cal prin ci ple rul ing the claims of eco nomic sci ence, “the 
in vis i ble hand,” establishes that suc cess ful in ter ven tion in the eco nomic do main 
can never be at trib uted to the or der of things itself but is at trib ut able to the things 
we or der—as un de ter mined sub jects of choice or risk-tak ers in the mar ket, as crit i­
cal an a lysts of em pir i cally un ver i fi able dis trib u tive pat terns in eco nom ics, and, nec­
es sar i ly, by ex ten sion, as de lib er a tive au thor i ties on eco nomic pol i cy­mak ing at the 
level of the state. The mar ket­based mode of or der ing things is ex plain able by a 
tech ni cal ra tio nale that, sur pris ing ly, when com pared to the many other ex pres­
sions of mod ern knowl edge that Foucault had in ves ti gated dur ing his ca reer, does 
not as pire to de pict hu man ex pe ri ence through a to tal iz ing, all ­encompassing or 
“fi nite” por trait of an in te rior re al i ty.81 The so­called “true” or “un der ly ing” or der 
of things in so ci ety could not be unearthed and mapped, in this case, as though it 
were a kind of se cret awaiting dis cov ery via a her me neu tic read ing of our selves.82 
It is rather thanks to the in vis i bil ity of the fac tors surrounding homo economicus—
thanks to the un cer tain ex er cise of judg ment that all en tre pre neur ial agents in the 
econ omy must per form in or der to ven ture a guess as to which de ci sion would be 
(in sup pos edly ob jec tive terms, according to neoclassical eco nom ics) in their own 
best in ter est—that a “spon ta ne ous,” if far from nat u ral or de ter mined, or der of 
things of er ing the pos si bil ity of op ti mal ef  ciency can be deemed plau si ble.
Although leav ing many ques tions unanswered, Foucault’s read ing opens a pro­
duc tive line of questioning, for it elu ci dates some thing that both mar ket en thu si­
asts and mar ket crit ics have long strugg led to rec on cile; name ly, that it is pos si ble 
to ac knowl edge that the mod ern sec u lar pro duc tion of eco nomic knowl edge can be 
built upon a true (i. e., rea son able or ac cept able) state ment of “spon ta ne ous or der,” 
with out our then hav ing to ac cept a tel e o log i cal in fer ence about its global dis trib­
u tive ef ects. Acknowledging that an en tre pre neur ial or der of things can come 
into ex is tence and have a par tic u lar ef  ciency should not amount to ac knowl edg­
ing that such a hy per com pet i tive model is the most de sir able plau si ble or der for 
any econ omy sim ply be cause it can be ac cepted that “it works” or has an in ter nal 
logic that makes sense with out the need to rely on a her me neu tic fan tasy about the 
har mo ni ous es sence of the eco nomic sub ject. For an in flu en tial voice on the cri sis 
of neo lib er al ism such as Mirowski—who is aware of the fact that Hayek does not 
rely on an es sen tial ized ver sion of homo economicus de fined as a kind of “qua si­om­
ni scient” sub ject with a nat u ral un der stand ing of his own in ter est83—the no tion 
of “spon ta ne ous or der” is still to blame for the in ad e quate tech ni cal knowl edge 
of ered by to day’s dom i nant neoclassical eco nom ics.84 Foucault, how ev er, en cour­
ages us to re main open to this no tion, which is so con sti tu tive of the so cial sci ences, 
in or der to re duce its an a lyt i cal ef ec tiv ity to its proper pro por tions and in this way 
reappropriate its po lit i cal sig nifi  cance.85
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Conclusion: The Market Always Works
Foucault’s lec ture quickly moves on af er pointing to a cer tain irony as its only prac­
ti cal im pli ca tion. But this hint of irony itself is al ready enough to mark an ad vance 
in the his tor i cal po lit i cal de bate with Hayek’s tech ni cal thought. If “one must gov­
ern by lis ten ing to the econ o mists” but with out re ally lis ten ing to them or fully 
em brac ing their “in ter nal prin ci ples,” this means that the kind of knowl edge that 
pri or i tizes the in vis i ble hand is not al ways ap pli ca ble or rel e vant. At least some­
times, we should not lis ten to those with mar ket ex per tise.
This im pli ca tion is much more rad i cal than the one drawn by some con tem­
po rary econ o mists who have been try ing to re cover “the art of eco nom ics” as the 
third axis of their dis ci pline.86 Beyond a clas si cal di vi sion be tween “nor ma tive” and 
“pos i tive” ori en ta tions, these econ o mists have been ad vo cat ing for a more ho lis tic 
ap proach to ap plied eco nom ics, one that can pass nor ma tive ide als and pos i tive 
for mu las through a con tex tual fil ter, thus in te grat ing non eco nomic var i ables at 
the mo ment of ad vis ing pol icy mak ers. Foucault’s speech act, how ev er, af rms the 
po lit i cal pri macy of “the art of gov ern ment” over any type of con tri bu tion from an 
ex pert who pri or i tizes the spon ta ne ous or der of the mar ket. Foucault’s rea son ing 
does not fol low a cri tique that is ex ter nal to eco nomic knowl edge. The un der ly ing 
point is not that a mul ti dis ci plin ary ap proach needs to com ple ment the dis ci pline 
be cause an ex clu sive fo cus on the mar ket is ul ti mately flawed, that is, un able to 
in te grate the com plex ity of the real world with the count less non eco nomic fac tors 
that tra verse it. This flaw is ac tu ally a strength for the mar ket so lu tion, at least to 
the ex tent that the operativity that it is said to have as a kind of “in vis i ble hand” 
can be explained as the ef ect that en tre pre neur ial com pe ti tion uniquely has in an 
un pre dict ably com plex world.
The strange prob lem that the so lu tion of mar ket com pe ti tion in stead poses is 
that, even as it fun da men tally relies on vol a tile ex ter nal fac tors that could po ten­
tially be treated in many cases as “ex ter nal i ties”—which for neoclassical econ o­
mists amount to “mar ket fail ures,” for eco nomic so ci ol o gists to “over flows,” and for 
mar ket so cial ists to “so cial waste”87—it still re mains pos si ble to find in tel li gi bil ity 
in its in ter nal stra te gic logic and ul ti mately to ac cept the claim that it amounts to 
a spon ta ne ous mech a nism or tech ni cal ar range ment that al ways works. As long as 
some min i mal con di tions for eco nomic com pe ti tion are be ing fa cil i tated by gov­
ern men tal au thor i ties, the mar ket mech a nism is al ways at work. No mat ter how 
poorly a po lit i cal pro gram ori ented to un fet tered com pe ti tion seems to be per­
forming or how much in ter fer ence a na tional econ omy is fac ing from opaque, if 
not en tirely dark, fac tors—from or ga nized crime and po lit i cal cor rup tion to so cial 
un rest and chronic in equal i ty88—it re mains true that the price mech a nism in serts 
homo economicus “in the best pos si ble way” within the econ omy in the sense that it 
con tin u ally en cour ages sys temic ef  ciency by allowing any in di vid ual with a van­
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tage point and priv i leged po si tion within the existing eco nomic field to be come 
a risktaker and per son ally ex plore un tapped sources of pro duc tiv i ty, in no va tion, 
and, of course, profi t, by experimenting with cost­re duc ing meth ods.
The fact that the price­driven dy namic of com pe ti tion “al ways works” ex plains 
why Hayek can em brace it so blind ly, and per haps why the whole of neo lib er al ism 
can be built upon the idea of “constructing” a free mar ket, as Foucault fa mously 
di ag nosed and as is largely agreed upon to this day.89 The irony contained within 
the idea that a mar ket so lu tion “al ways works” is clearly lost in this tra di tion of 
thought. And yet, the crit i cal prob lem at stake can not be au to mat i cally re duced 
to a mat ter of ideo log i cal bi as, since it is pos si ble to dis cern the con cep tual chal­
lenge that it in volves. It has be come al most im pos si ble for a post­1989, dem o crat­
i cally elected pol icy maker to counter the view that the eco nomic man age ment of 
a na tion can not but de pend on the en tre pre neur ial mar ket, if in deed it seeks to 
de velop the full pro duc tive po ten tial of its hu man and phys i cal re sources, dis cover 
how to man age them with “op ti mal ef  cien cy,” or, what amounts to the same thing, 
re duce the rel a tive phe nom e non of scar city to its low est pos si ble lev el.90
Currently, I think, we find our selves in a his tor i cally unique sce nar io. The 
con text of a global pan demic of ers us a kind of un fore seen thought­ex per i ment 
or “in duc tive” ex am ple, that is, the kind of ex am ple that can in duce more gen eral 
thought rather than one that can ex em plify a gen eral idea that has al ready been 
fully thought out as an ab strac tion.91 The dis rup tive eco nomic sce nario cre ated by 
COVID­19 may not have the well­de fined bound aries of a hy po thet i cal case, but 
the way it has come to uni ver sally re di rect our col lec tive ex pe ri ence is com pel ling 
enough to con sider it an ob jec tive ba sis from which mod ern eco nomic thought 
might imag ine a new range of pos si bil i ties. In re cent months, good governing has 
be come an art of deal ing with the looming threat of hav ing to “close” the econ­
o my. But, even more im por tant ly, this pe riod has taught us to ob serve the econ omy 
through the lens of the con cept of “so cial re stric tions.” Like Trump, any gov ern­
men tal au thor ity can be tempted to min i mize these re stric tions and de fi antly keep 
the econ omy “open” against the ep i de mi o log i cal ra tio nale that “the best form of 
eco nomic stim u lus imag in able” is to as sure “pub lic ad her ence to re stric tions on 
a scale suf  cient to bring R num ber [the av er age in fec tion rate per sick per son] 
be low one.”92 Yet, what is most in ter est ing is that, even with out a lock down, any 
econ omy in the cur rent cri sis is sub ject to a min i mal level of so cial dis tanc ing mea­
sures that it can not over come; and, with this in ev i ta ble lim it, a neo lib eral jus ti fi ca­
tion for the open ing of the econ omy no lon ger seems to ap ply.
Yes, even in these pre car i ous cir cum stances—with shops, ware houses, and 
all the con fined spaces within the sup ply chain fac ing lim i ta tions in their pro duc­
tive and dis trib u tive capacities—the mar ket mech a nism is still bound to “work.” 
A cen tral bank can di min ish the en tre pre neur’s risk of in vest ment through low or 
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even neg a tive in ter est rates, and this type of pol icy can en cour age the dis cov ery, 
as al ways, of the cheapest ways of exploiting the re sources that might be found in 
the existing con di tions. But the idea that a state’s eco nomic man age ment should 
be guided by the neo lib eral as pi ra tion to re main as pro duc tively in ge nious as is 
hu manly pos si ble loses much of its self­ev i dence un der cur rent con di tions. The 
logic that through en tre pre neur ial com pe ti tion we can reach “op ti mal ef  cien cy” 
in the man age ment of scarce re sources be comes sus cep ti ble to questioning, for, 
as we un dergo a col lec tive ex pe ri ence of both eco nomic and ex is ten tial hard ship, 
we can read ily sense that, how ever much in no va tion adds to our cur rent meth­
ods of pro duc tion, this ad di tion by itself is not prom is ing. The up per limit for 
the “giv en” quan tity of goods we can pro duce dur ing the pan demic could slightly 
in crease, but the value of this achieve ment be comes itself rel a tive in terms of how 
much it ac tu ally con trib utes to an en tire so ci e ty’s eco nomic prob lem of keep ing 
scar city at bay. The prob lem of “scar ci ty,” this pan demic force fully re minds us, has 
to do with maintaining goods and needs se curely connected, which is some thing 
that can not be ex haus tively addressed by insisting on dis cov er ing how pro duc tive 
we can be.
“Social re stric tions” could mean many dif er ent things, but in the con text of 
our own pres ent ex pe ri ence, this con cept in vites a se ri ous in ter ro ga tion of the 
many eco nomic con texts in which en tre pre neur ial mo bil ity might be subjected to 
in trac ta ble lim i ta tions, ren der ing the scope of its man i fes ta tion and im pact under­
whelming. In or der to de fine what, the o ret i cally speak ing, “so cial re stric tions” 
might mean, we would surely need to en gage in a long de bate. But the point is that 
this lived thought ex per i ment rad i cally re opens the po lit i cal de bate stem ming from 
Hayek’s tech ni cal prop o si tion, cre at ing space for a nu anced uni verse of eco nomic 
pos si bil i ties. Afer all , as Foucault’s ge ne al ogy an tic i pat ed, only an “en ter prise so ci­
e ty” with an eq ui ta ble dis tri bu tion of its prop erty rights and means of pro duc tion 
would al low a neo lib eral state to ex ploit ev ery sin gle in di vid u al’s unique en tre pre­
neur ial in sights into the econ o my.93 Any so ci ety where this equal dis tri bu tion is 
not con sid ered to be re al is ti cally pos si ble would de serve, then, to be scru ti nized 
through the crit i cal lens of “so cial re stric tions.”
Grasping an eco nomic in tu i tion in on to log i cal de tail is not a straight for ward 
con cep tual task. As Judith Butler has suggested, for ex am ple, the re cent global 
fi nan cial cri sis could be explained as the re sult of our fail ure to con cep tu al ize the 
on to log i cal limit to the spec u la tive ap proach of to day’s fi nan cial mar kets, which 
in com pre hen si bly “seek to de rive end less pos si bil i ties from lim ited re sources.”94 
A crit i cal the o rist might im me di ately agree that the prob lem atic of “scar ci ty” or 
the cor re la tion be tween needs and goods could be best addressed by pri or i tiz ing, 
within the eco nomic ar chi tec ture of a na tion, some other as pect than en tre pre­
neur ial mo bil i ty. And yet, with out a full­blown the ory to ri val Hayek’s eco nomic 
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in tu i tion, the man tra of com pe ti tion, no mat ter how un ver i fi able, re tains its ap par­
ent self­ev i dence. The ex pe ri ence of this global pan demic points pre cisely to a way 
of grasp ing the on to log i cal lim its of the in vis i ble hand, and to a way of il lus trat ing 
the su pe rior eco nomic judg ment of the art of gov ern ment, with out the need for a 
ready made or fully de vel oped al ter na tive the o ry.
Afer all , if, as a Foucauldian anal y sis of ep i ste mic opac ity in mod ern knowl­
edge al lows us to ap pre ci ate, the art of gov ern ment in deed has pri macy over the 
spon ta ne ous or der of the mar ket, there is no rea son in fact why this art should 
re quire a uni ver sal eco nomic the ory that can tell it what is best at all times and 
ab so lutely ev ery where. A more ur gent ep i ste mic need is find ing a com pel ling il lus­
tra tion of the “cha os” or, at any rate, the un cer tain con di tions that are bound to 
re main “in vis i ble” in the back ground of any tech ni cal so lu tion that is  able to work 
with them re gard less of their spe cific con tent. Using Hayek’s log ic, gov ern men tal 
thought can re main blind to a his tor i cally nu anced di ag no sis of what the econ omy 
in the pres ent needs. The phe nom e non of global hun ger might have long since 
been seen as a solv able cri sis based on the un con tro ver sial, eas ily quan ti fi able ex is­
tence of “abun dance” in food goods.95 Today’s cri sis, to the ex tent that it is a con­
certed eco nomic pause, may in prin ci ple be solv able via a pol icy fo cus on a “liv able 
in come guar an tee” and dis trib u tive needs rather than on na tional growth of the 
pro duc tive ca pac i ty.96 And yet the mar ket’s seem ingly self­ev i dent func tion al ity—
how ever par tial it is—can en cour age au tom a tism and tel e ol ogy in gov ern men tal 
thought. This is pre cisely the irony that Foucault cap tured for pos ter i ty. For if the 
mar ket mech a nism al ways works, then we can not pos si bly rely on its in ter nal logic 
for po lit i cal de ci sion­mak ing, since what this means is that it works in de pen dently 
of and with out any regard for what our own eco nomic sce nario is.
Coda: On Foucauldian Irony
Foucauldian irony is not what at times it has been thought to be—a sense of his­
tor i cal ir rel e vance in in tel lec tual cri tique due to “the in ev i ta ble sub ver sive re la tion 
of power to knowl edge.”97 To put his ironic tone into per spec tive, we only need to 
think of how Arendt’s com ment about the “com mu nis tic fic tion” that un der lies the 
no tion of the in vis i ble hand, for ex am ple, relies on the op po site of the type of irony 
that Foucault has in mind, as some one who even felt com fort able at times call ing 
his own work “fic tion.” Reflecting on The Order of Things dur ing an in ter view, he 
claimed, for ex am ple: “My book is a pure and sim ple fic tion: it is a nov el, but it is not 
I who invented it, it is the re la tion ship of our age and its epis te mo log i cal con fig u ra­
tion with that whole mass of state ments” we treat as his to ry.98
Allow me to dwell for a mo ment on what is so ironic about this par tic u lar 
state ment on “non­lit er ary fic tion.”99 Surely the as ser tion that an ac a demic work 
is “fic tion al” has lit tle to do in this state ment with a con trast be tween il lu sion and 
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re al i ty. The claim that “our age” invented this fic tion and it is not the re searcher 
“who invented it” pre sup poses a cer tain type of objectivity, a sci en tific out look, 
or, at any rate, some me thod i cal op er a tion that, through its ef ec tive ap pli ca tion, 
guar an tees a sta ble re la tion ship be tween a pres ent “epis te mo log i cal con fig u ra tion” 
and a “whole mass of state ments” from a con crete past. To this ex tent, fic tion con­
sti tutes in this case a way of re fer ring to fruit ful knowl edge. History in gen eral 
may nat u rally be one of those ob jects of study to which, even in the most rig or ous 
re con struc tion, Foucault’s char ac ter iza tion of “fic tion” applies. But equally “fic­
tion al” are most ac a demic prac tices. To take an ex treme case, even the “Gal i lean 
style” of phys i cal cal cu la tion de pends on ef ec tive fic tions. As the phys i cist Steven 
Weinberg once reflected, “the uni verse does not seem to have been pre pared with 
hu man be ings in mind, and the idea that hu mans can build math e mat i cal mod els 
of the uni verse and find that they work is re mark able.”100
Some of Foucault’s most in flu en tial in ter loc u tors have sim i larly pointed to this 
coun ter in tu i tive logic of ironic de tach ment in his rhet o ric. Ian Hacking worked 
hard at de vel op ing the ox y mo ronic con cept of “his tor i cal on tol o gy” by pay ing 
at ten tion to the way Foucault “half­jok ingly ac cepted that he has a no tion of a 
‘his tor i cal a pri o ri.’ ”101 Butler has in turn been fas ci nated by the way Foucault was 
 able to ask such a ques tion as: “Can a trans his tor i cal sub ject of a phe nom e no log i­
cal kind be accounted for by a his tory of rea son?”102 For her, as for any stu dent of 
phi los o phy, explaining phe nom e nol ogy through his tory is as coun ter in tu i tive as 
an ob jec tive work of fic tion, or a his tor i cal ho ri zon tak ing on the role of a Kantian 
a pri o ri. As Butler re flects, per haps the rea son be hind Foucault’s pe cu liar use of 
irony is that, “no existing the ory can pro vide terms to for mu late the ques tion[s] 
he wants to pose.”103 In Foucault’s own terms, one could speak of his ap proach 
to knowl edge as one that re fuses the black mail of be ing ei ther for or against the 
Enlightenment.104 More spe cifi  cal ly, as Bernard Harcourt re cently re cov ered the 
term, we could speak of a con struc tion of knowl edge that is nei ther pos i tiv ist nor 
antipositivist but in stead “count er­pos i tiv ist.”105
The im pli ca tions of this re la tion to mod ern knowl edge are dif  cult to grasp. 
But by ex am in ing the case of the in vis i ble hand, I have sought to cap ture one 
im por tant fea ture of a count er­pos i tiv ist stance: the kind of irony that is not anti­
foundational but that rather fol lows from revisiting the foun da tional in sights of 
“mod ern” (nonsubjugated) knowl edge with sin cere open ness in or der to con sider 
crit i cally the tech ni cal con sis tency of their own re gimes of truth.106 Famously, 
Richard Rorty sought to en cour age a cul ture of “lib eral iro ny” that regarded 
hu man rights as a so cially de fend able but ul ti mately un founded truth lacking uni­
ver sal jus ti fi ca tion.107 Conversely, Foucault en cour ages us to ac knowl edge with 
irony the el e ments of truth that can be sal vaged within mod ern modes of think­
ing and know ing, which may be bound to re main only del i cately teth ered to an 
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“ex ter nal” or self­stand ing re al i ty, but which none the less pos sess the ca pac ity to 
pro duce more or less suc cess ful fic tions and more or less crit i cally con sis tent or ders 
of things.
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77. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery,” 10, 12.
78. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery,” 22.
79. Hayek, “Pretence of Knowledge,” 4.
80. Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 286.
81. Foucault, Order of Things, 340–43.
82. As Thomas Nagel classically argued, there has never been such a thing as a “view from 
nowhere” but only perspectives that seek to position themselves closer to this imagined 
vantage point (View from Nowhere, 5–6). Lorraine Daston and Bruno Latour have developed 
two of the most revealing accounts of this counterintuitive predicament, showing how the 
idea that “nature” is waiting for us to observe it in its true and only possible order is a cultural 
expectation, how it does not reflect a more objective understanding of reality. To satisfy the 
scientific demand for superimposable reports, scientists have long had to prioritize standard 
communication to the point of editing facts and dismissing accuracy for the sake of public 
intelligibility (Daston, “Objectivity and the Escape”; Latour, “Relativistic Account”).
83. Hayek, “Economics and Knowledge,” 45; Plehwe, Slobodian, and Mirowski, Nine Lives of 
Neoliberalism, 5.
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84. Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis.
85. See Palacios, “Society, Like the Market.”
86. See especially Su, “Beyond the Positive­Normative Dichotomy.”
87. Davies, “Economics and the ‘Nonsense’ of Law,” 68; Callon, Laws of the Markets, 18; Lange, 
“On the Economic Theory,” pt. 2, 126.
88. For economists themselves, these dark factors are starting to become a more urgent matter 
of technical concern (Basu, Beyond the Invisible Hand, 25–27).
89. Plehwe, Slobodian, and Mirowski, “Nine Lives of Neoliberalism,” 6.
90. See Bockman, “Long Road to 1989.”
91. Marshall, “Origin and Character,” 379.
92. Krueger, “Open Secret.”
93. Foucault, Birth of Biopolitics, 146–49. The socialist logic of this critical insight can actually 
be seen in the founding texts of neoclassical economics, and during the second half of 
the twentieth century this logic was further explored by Eastern European economists 
supportive of free market competition through worker­self­managed enterprises 
(Bockman, “Long Road to 1989”).
94. Butler, “Performative Agency,” 153.
95. Doaud, “(Quasi)Scarcity and Global Hunger.”
96. See Quiggin, Klein, and Henderson, “Forget JobSeeker.”
97. Fernandez, “Irony of Complicity,” 92.
98. Foucault, Aesthetics, 286.
99. I have borrowed this term from the recent reflections of raúl rodríguez freire on the 
fictional tales that have helped to naturalize the ruling notion of “scarcity” within modern 
political economy. His focus, however, is on the contrast between “literary” fictions and 
“legal” ones that “camouflage their fictional nature” (“Of Goats, Theorems, and Laws,” 82). 
A discussion of Foucault’s counter­positivism allows us to appreciate one other possibility: 
that of “nonliterary” fictions that, instead of denying the work of imagination that goes into 
their composition, actively seek to remain accountable for their logico­discursive efects in 
the always somewhat mythical production of a shared interpretation of reality.
100. Weinberg, “Forces of Nature,” 28.
101. Hacking, Historical Ontology, 91.
102. Quoted in Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 115.
103. Butler, Giving an Account of Oneself, 115.
104. Foucault, Politics of Truth, 110.
105. Harcourt, “Counter­Critical Theory,” 14.
106. Compare with Harcourt, “Counter­Critical Theory,” 15.
107. Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. For a broader contextualization of Rorty’s position 
within contemporary political theory, see Sagar, “From Scepticism to Liberalism?”
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